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Technical summary 
A growing literature uses credit register data to identify how policy changes 
induce credit shocks and how such shocks transmit to the real economy. This 
literature matches individual loan data to lenders (banks) and borrowers (firms) and 
then exploits the existence of multiple lending relationships to distinguish between 
demand and supply effects. Any systematic credit response by the same firm across 
banks is interpreted as a shift in credit demand, while any systematic credit response 
by the same bank across firms is interpreted as a shift in credit supply. 
In this paper, we show that corporate loans vary by type and that accounting for 
loan type is consequential for the estimation of credit channels and the interpretation 
of results in the existing literature. Our empirical analysis is based on credit registry 
data from Spain and Peru. 
We start by showing that in both countries the bulk of bank commercial credit 
can be grouped into four main types: asset-based loans, cash flow loans, trade 
finance agreements, and leases. The first two types of loans are the most common 
type of credit in both countries, both in terms of number and volume of loans.  
We then show that what we know about the magnitude of the credit supply 
effects is driven by specific loan-types. To do so, we reexamine several notable 
studies, zooming in on individual loan types. We find that aggregate credit supply 
shocks constructed using existing methodologies differ substantially across loan 
types, and that existing empirical results are sensitive to the type of loan considered. 
Our findings have several of implications. 
First, failing to account for loan type leads to a mismeasurement of the credit 
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channel effect. The main methodology used in the literature to identify credit 
channels performs a within-firm cross-sectional comparison of lenders’ behavior. 
This approach relies on the assumption that firm-specific changes in credit demand 
are constant across lenders, so that the estimated differences can be attributed to 
differences in credit supply. But, to the degree that there is a correlation between 
investment opportunities and credit type, and if different lenders provide different 
loan types to a given borrower, the identifying assumption that the borrower’s credit 
demand is fixed across lenders is violated.   
Second, existing approaches to identifying credit channels rely on data on 
borrowers with multiple lenders at a given point in time and thereby discard a 
significant fraction of the borrowers in the economy (namely all single lender 
borrowers). Thus, the generalizability of the conclusions emerging from such 
identification as well as the policy implications are dependent on the broader 
distribution of credit. Indeed, we show that a substantial number of borrowers rely on 
a single loan type. Moreover, the type of loans used by these firms tends to be 
extremely persistent. However, we find that the overlap, at a given point in time, 
between the sample of borrowers that rely on one lender and the sample of borrowers 
that rely on one loan is substantial: about 79% of single-lender borrowers are also 
single-loan type for Spain; this number is 69% for Peru. 
Finally, a recently emerging literature focuses not on whether there is a 
connection between bank credit shocks and economic activity but on the 
measurement of the sensitivity of real output to bank funding shocks, and the 
economic mechanisms underlying this connection. Recognizing that these 
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sensitivities vary by the type of credit is an important advance in both of these 
directions. Specifically, because the differences between the types of commercial 
credit are rooted in the nature of collateral, it would likely affect young and old firms 
differentially, as well as firms in different industries.  
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1. Introduction
Worldwide, much of commercial credit consists of four distinct types of loans: (i)
asset-based loans, (ii) cash flow loans, (iii) trade finance agreements, and (iv) leases.1 
All of these loans are senior and secured; however, they differ in the type of 
collateral that backs them (or, to be precise, the net recovery from the sale of 
collateral). This separation of commercial credit is widely acknowledged in practice, 
but has only been partially recognized in academic research. In particular, to date, the 
work relying on the use of credit registry does not make this distinction, treating all 
credit of the same firm as directly comparable. Using credit registry data from both 
an advanced economy, Spain, and an emerging market, Peru, we document the 
universal use and economic importance of these types of credit and empirically 
examine how these different types of credit impact the bank credit channel.  
The core characteristics of collateral are its liquidation value, pledgeability, and 
durability. These characteristics are at the heart of the existence of different types of 
commercial credit. Although some of these differences are not due to intrinsic 
characteristics of the physical asset used as a collateral, but differences in 
repossession of collateral, as in the case of asset-based loans versus leasing (e.g., 
Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Gavazza, 2011; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013). 
Leasing is an arrangement where the creditor finances an asset and the firm uses it in 
exchange for fixed rental payments. From a collateral perspective, asset-based loans 
are comparable to leases: both are secured by large, typically registered physical 
assets with a relatively clear liquidation value (for example, a building or an 
airplane). The difference, as emphasized by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), is that 
leasing separates ownership and use of the asset, making it easy to repossess the asset 
by the lender in case of a default. So the pledged physical asset can be (and often is) 
identical across these two different types of loans, but the recovery in default is 
different due to the difference in pledgeability. 
1 These different types of credit are widely acknowledged by the industry and bank 
regulators. We abstract from factoring, which is the sale of accounts receivable, as 
opposed to borrowing against them as one would do in cash flow-based financing. 
Factoring generally constitutes a negligible fraction of commercial credit. 
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A significant fraction of commercial credit consists of cash flow loans. Lian and 
Ma (2018) estimate that as much as 80% of syndicated credit in the U.S. is cash-flow 
based. The difference between asset-based loans and cash flow loans can again be 
understood from the perspective of the collateral used to secure the credit. As already 
mentioned, in the case of asset-based loans, the borrower pledges specific physical 
assets to secure the loan. In the case of cash flow loans, the lender has a senior claim 
on all unencumbered assets of the company; that is, the lender has a first claim on all 
proceeds from asset liquidations (excluding assets that were already pledged).2 
Overall, the collateral in cash flow loans differs from asset-based loans and leases in 
several dimensions: it is oftentimes less durable, has lower liquidation value due to 
its less standardized nature, and has lower pledgeability due to uncertainty about its 
value (e.g., intellectual property or retailer inventory) or lack of title (e.g., computers 
and office furniture). Indeed, a typical credit agreement for a cash flow loan does not 
have a comprehensive list of what represents collateral in the transaction. It is its 
senior secured position in the capital structure—and not the claim over specific 
assets—that allows it to have recovery in case of a default.3 As a result, in the credit 
assessment of the cash flow loan, the emphasis is not on the value of collateral (as in 
the case of an asset-based loan), but on the borrower’s ability to pay the interest and 
amortization (hence, the label “cash flow” loan). 
The last significant category of commercial credit—trade finance—backs 
business-to-business (B2B) transactions.4 This type of credit is backed by a bilateral 
contract, such as a contract for delivery of goods. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) 
2 It is common for a company that has many hard assets to split its collateral using a 
subsidiary structure and get an asset-based loan backed by hard assets in parallel to a 
cash-flow based loan backed by all other remaining assets. This has a direct parallel to 
person credit: it is common for an individual to have a separate mortgage, car loan, and a 
student loan.  
3 A standard credit agreement also includes a series of “catch-all” restrictions on asset 
sales, which helps to preserve the recovery in default. 
4 Not to be confused with “trade credit,” which is credit granted directly by companies to 
their business clients.  
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provide a detailed insight into the working of trade finance.5 The loan in this case is 
backed by the goods that are being transacted, so the collateral is well identified, 
valued (and insured), and the title of the good is in transfer (so it is not yet part of 
what will become collateral of a cash flow loan). Trade finance agreements are 
probably closest to cash flow loans, but the pledgeability of the collateral in this case 
is higher. To be fair, there are other unique features of trade finance agreements, as it 
involves multiple counterparties and the credit risk in this case is no longer simply 
that of the borrower.  
There are also other distinctions in terms of processes and sources of capital 
among the four lending categories. However, we want to highlight that in practice 
one often observes that borrowers have multiple loans outstanding of different loan 
type, and that the collateral for these different loan types can be partitioned without 
generating conflict among creditors. Importantly, what emerges from the earlier 
discussion is that different loan types carry different credit risks and involve different 
practices for mitigating negative shocks. Different loan types would also be 
differentially affected by fluctuations in the value of collateral.  
As we will show—precisely because of its ubiquity—accounting for loan type 
using representative credit registry data appears to be straightforward. Moreover, 
accounting for the loan type is pivotal for several reasons:  
First, failing to account for loan type leads to a mismeasurement of the credit 
channel effect. The methodology in Khwaja and Mian (2008), henceforth KM,—the 
workhorse of the literature focused on transmission of financial shocks to the real 
economy—performs a within-firm cross-sectional comparison of lenders’ behavior. 
This approach relies on the assumption that firm-specific changes in credit demand 
are constant across lenders, hence the estimated differences can be attributed to 
differences in credit supply. But, to the degree that there is a correlation between 
investment opportunities and credit type, and if different lenders provide different 
loan types to a given borrower, the identifying assumption that the borrower’s credit 
5 Although Amiti and Weinstein (2011) focus on international trade, the arrangements 
used in local trade have similar feature, as trade concerns a delivery of contracted goods. 
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demand is fixed across lenders is violated.6 (See Appendix 1 for a more detailed 
description of the biases that arise when using the KM methodology without 
accounting for loan heterogeneity.)  
Second, the caveat of the KM methodology, which relied on borrowers with 
multiple lenders at a given point in time, is that it discards a significant fraction of 
the borrowers in the economy (the single lender borrowers).7 Thus, the 
generalizability of the conclusions emerging from such identification, as well as the 
policy implications, are dependent on the broader distribution of credit. Indeed, we 
show that a substantial number of borrowers in most economies rely on a single loan 
type. Historically, this number was 60% in Spain and 42% in Peru. Moreover, the 
type of loans used by these firms tends to be extremely persistent. Note that just 
because a borrower has a relationship with one lender does not mean that it relies on 
one loan type. However, we find that the overlap, at a given point in time, between 
the sample of borrowers that rely on one lender and the sample of borrowers that rely 
on one loan is substantial: about 79% of single-lender borrowers are also single-loan 
type for Spain; this number is 69% for Peru.  
Finally, there is a large body of literature that shows that bank credit shocks affect 
economic activity. The focus of more recent literature has not been on whether such 
connections exist, but on the measurement of the sensitivity of real output to bank 
funding shocks, and the economic mechanisms underlying this connection. Thus, 
recognizing that these sensitivities vary by the type of credit is an important advance 
6 We know that large lenders can provide any loan type. This is not to say that you could 
easily switch the type of credit across existing lenders. For example, if a given borrower 
has a cash flow loan with bank “A” and an asset-based loan with bank “B”, then it is 
likely to go back to bank “A” when it needs to increase its cash flow loan. As we said, 
different loan types are about different credit risk, the type of screening and monitoring is 
likely to be specific to a given loan type. So information frictions in lender switching—
for a given loan type—are likely.  
7 Using monthly observations, Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2015) find that 46% of 
borrowers in Bolivia have only one lender at a given point in time. Bolton et al. (2016) 
show that this number for Italy is 60%, and, according to Morais et al. (2019), 79% of 
Mexican firms tend to have one lender. Quarterly data used in Khwaja and Mian (2008) 
for Pakistan, Iyer et al. (2014) for Portugal, and Baskaya et al. (2017) for Turkey show 
that the fraction of borrowers with one lending relationship is 90%, 25%, and 54%, 
respectively.  
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in both of these directions. Specifically, because the differences between the types of 
commercial credit are rooted in the nature of collateral, it would likely affect young 
and old firms differentially, as well as firms in different industries. Although this 
implication of our findings is outside of the scope of this paper, it could lead to a 
better understanding of the sources of financial constraints in the cross-section of 
firms, and over a firm’s lifecycle.  
Our empirical analysis is based on the credit registry data from Spain and Peru. 
We start by showing that in both countries the bulk of bank commercial credit can be 
grouped into four main types: asset-based loans, cash flow loans, trade finance 
agreements, and leases. The first two types of loans are the most common type of 
credit in both countries, both in terms of number and volume of loans. For instance, 
in 2004, asset-based loans accounted for 39.1% and cash flow loans accounted for 
48.2% of the volume of total commercial credit by banks in Spain. For Peru, these 
figures are 43.5% and 35.8%, respectively. The average size of asset-based loans is 
much larger than that of the other forms of credit, averaging about 1.0 million euros 
in the case of Spain and 6.4 million soles in the case of Peru.   
Thus, the first contribution of our paper is to give a comprehensive insight into 
the prevalence of different loan types in representative economies, and provide a 
transparent methodology for identifying loan-type in a credit registry data. The 
second contribution is to show that what we know about the magnitude of the credit 
supply effects is driven by specific loan-types. To do so, we reexamine several 
notable studies, zooming in on individual loan types.   
Applying the methodology proposed by Amiti and Weinstein (2018), we find that 
aggregate credit supply shocks constructed using their methodology differ 
substantially across loan types. In particular, in the Spanish data, we find that 
aggregate credit supply shocks are most strongly correlated with supply shocks in 
asset-based loans, while the correlation is weaker for cash flow loans, trade finance, 
and leasing. 
We re-estimate the baseline specifications in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and 
Saurina (2012), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabel and Wolfenzon (2015) and 
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Bentolila, Jansen and Jiménez (2018) separately for different loan types.8 Jiménez et 
al. (2012) uses Spanish data to assess how variation in bank capital interacts with 
changes in monetary policy rates to influence credit growth. Consistent with a risk-
taking channel of monetary policy, they find that lower interest rates spur loan 
growth especially at lowly capitalized banks. Paravisini et al. (2015) and Bentolila et 
al. (2018) build on the KM methodology using shocks to banks’ liquidity following 
the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, in Peru and Spain, respectively. Using variation 
in bank exposure they quantify relative effects of the credit channel. We find that the 
results in all of these papers are sensitive to the type of loan considered. Moreover, 
they appear to be driven mainly by cash flow loans, while asset-based loans exhibit a 
different pattern in the estimates.  
Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) argue that monetary policy affects the 
external finance premium of firms by altering the agency costs associated with 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders about the quality of firm 
investments. Easing monetary policy increases cash flows and collateral value, thus 
leading to a reduction in agency costs, which, in turn, makes it easier for the firm to 
borrow. While this theory does not have clear predictions for different loan types, 
arguably, the liquidation value of cash flow loans is more sensitive to changes in 
agency costs, in which case monetary policy should affect cash flow loans more so 
than loans based on hard collateral. Similarly, if in the financial crisis the rise in 
agency costs was dominating the impact on collateral, it would explain why we find 
that cash flow loans appear to be driving contraction in credit supply during the 
financial crisis.  
In this paper, we build on and contribute to a number of strands of literature. 
First, we contribute to the literature on how the supply of credit is influenced by 
monetary policy and financial shocks including Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010) and the set of papers that trace the impact of credit market disruptions on real 
8 Note that these are cross-sectional estimates, whereas Amiti and Weinstein (2018) 
focus on the time-series behavior of the credit shocks. We will elaborate on the 
assumptions and methodological differences in these papers later on. 
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outcomes including Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), and Chodorow-Reich 
(2013).  
Naturally, our paper contributes to the large body of empirical studies that build 
on the empirical approach in Khwaja and Mian (2008) and use loan-level data to 
measure effects of credit shocks and their transmission. As already mentioned, we 
will specifically replicate Jiménez et al. (2012), Paravisini et al. (2015) and Bentolila 
et al. (2018). Perhaps closest to our research are recent papers by Paravisini, 
Rappoport and Schnabl (2017), which considers lender specialization, and Jiménez, 
Mian, Peydró and Saurina (2019), which incorporates firm-level general equilibrium 
adjustments. Both studies refine the KM methodology. We contribute to this 
literature by considering the importance of loan types. We show that this 
differentiation is grounded in actual lending practices of banks and that credit growth 
dynamics and bank lending channels vary across loan types.     
Finally, there is the emerging literature focused on quantifying the aggregate 
effects of credit shocks on real outcomes, such as investment and output. We 
specifically build on Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and show that accounting for loan 
types is also relevant in evaluating the drivers of aggregate effects.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data from the Spanish and 
Peruvian credit registry. Section 3 shows patterns of use of different types of 
commercial loans by borrowers. In Section 4, we present results of estimating effects 
of credit supply accounting for loan heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data
In the analysis, we use credit registry data from two countries: Spain and Peru.
Credit registries (or credit bureaus) are depositories of loan level information 
typically collected and maintained by the central bank for purposes of monitoring 
and regulation. They are also regularly used by local lenders to verify the credit 
history of a prospective borrower. To the extent that the type of credit is key 
information for assessing credit risk, information on the type of credit should be 
recorded in a credit registry and in any other major loan-level database. That is 
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indeed the case in Spanish and Peruvian credit registries.9 We elaborate on this 
below.     
Typically, a credit registry tracks loan stock, that is, outstanding credit amount 
with monthly or quarterly frequency. One cannot observe individual loans in such 
data, but instead one observes lending relationships for a given borrower at a given 
point in time. Empirical work building on Khwaja and Mian (2008) generally 
constrains the analysis to observations in periods when the borrower has more than 
one lending relationship outstanding. As discussed earlier, this substantially limits 
the sample of borrowers used in the estimation. In our data, restricting the sample to 
firms with multiple lending relationships drops the number of unique borrowers by 
50 percentage points for Spain and 39 percentage points for Peru. Naturally, once 
one accounts for loan type, this further restricts the sample of unique borrowers 
covered in the analysis. This is because, in the KM approach, borrowers that had one 
lender per loan type would be part of the analysis (as long as there is more than one 
lender/loan type). Once we account for the loan type, these borrowers drop from the 
sample. Given this constraint, in what follows we will consider quarterly 
observations as a less restrictive time-unit of observation. 
2.1 The Spanish CIR Dataset 
The Central Credit Register (Central de Información de Riesgos or CIR in 
Spanish) is maintained by the Banco de España in its role as primary banking 
supervisory agency, and contains detailed monthly information on all outstanding 
loans over 6,000 euros to non-financial firms granted by all banks operating in Spain 
since 1995. Given the low reporting threshold, virtually all firms with outstanding 
bank debt will appear in the CIR. We also use a dataset on loan applications, or, 
more precisely, bank requests for firm information, which are interpreted as loan 
9 Similarly, in the United States, widely available data on syndicated loan origination 
such as DealScan can be used to identify the types of credit by looking at Market 
segment and Loan type. 
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applications.10 By matching the monthly records on loan applications with the stock 
of credit, we infer whether the loan materialized. If not, either the bank denied it or 
the firm obtained funding elsewhere. This loan granting information is available from 
February 2002 onwards and is the same data used by Jiménez et al. (2012). Because 
several of the results will build on Jiménez et al. (2012), we restrict the Spanish 
sample to the 2002-2010 period. However, the descriptive statistics by loan type 
generalize to a longer sample.  
In the Spanish data, we identify four main loan types based on two first-order 
variables: Clase or loan-risk class and Garantia or collateral.11 From the indicator of 
type of risk, we consider the following three categories:12 trade finance or Crédito 
comercial (clase A) in Spanish, commercial and industrial (C&I) loans or Crédito 
financiero (clase B), and leasing or Operaciones de arrendamiento financiero (clase 
K). That is, leasing and trade finance in the Spanish data can be identified using 
solely Clase variable. To separate between asset-based and cash-flow based loans, 
we turn to information on collateral. Spanish credit registry focuses on non-personal 
collateral (Garantia real) that includes assets like real estate, naval mortgages, 
securities, deposits, and merchandise (i.e., hard collateral). As mentioned earlier, it is 
the senior secured status (and contractual restriction on asset sales) that imply that 
the loan has collateral. The definition of collateralization in Spanish and Peruvian 
credit registries only concerns whether the loan is collateralized by hard assets. In the 
Spanish data, we know whether the value of the loan is collateralized by hard assets 
at (i) 100%, (ii) (50%; 100%); or (iii) is not collateralized. However, 98% of the 
loans in the data either have 100% real collateral or no real collateral. We categorize 
C&I loans “with collateral” as asset-based loans, and as cash flow loans otherwise.  
10 Banco de España can fine those banks requesting information without intent of loan 
origination. 
11 For full details, we refer to Circular 3/1995, de 25 de septiembre, a entidades de 
crédito, sobre la Central de Información de Riesgos (available at: 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1995/BOE-A-1995-22113-consolidado.pdf). 
12 We exclude guarantees and other contingent claims that are recorded in the Spanish 
data: “avales, cauciones y garantías” account for around 10% in number of loans and 
“riesgo indirecto” for around 6%. All the other types represent between 0.02% and 
0.89% and are thus negligible. In terms of volume, these figures are even smaller.  
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Consistent with our categorization of loan types, in Appendix Table A1, we use 
balance-sheet information taken from Almunia et al. (2018) available for the firms in 
the Spanish sample, and confirm that firms with a higher share of fixed assets over 
total assets rely more on asset-based lending. In particular, asset tangibility has a 
strong economic and statistical power in explaining borrower’s reliance on asset-
based loans, yet practically no economic power on whether it uses leasing. On the 
other hand, the correlation between asset tangibility and borrower’s share of cash 
flow lending is negative. These results are robust to inclusion of controls for firm’s 
age, size, leverage, and industry.  
2.2 The Peruvian CIR Dataset 
Similar to the Spanish data, the Central Credit Register of Peru is maintained by 
the bank supervisory agency, which in this case is the Superintendencia de Banca y 
Seguros (SBS). The data available to us covers a period between January 2001 and 
April 2018.13 The sample is constraint to credit to firms with sales above 20 million 
soles in sales (about $6 at the current exchange rate). We further focus on lending by 
banks, finance companies and cajas (savings banks).14 Microcredit institutions are 
excluded from the sample.  
We assign loans into four basic types using the variable called Cuenta, which 
describes the type of loan as well as the collateral used in this transaction. We assign 
as asset-based credit the following loan types: garantía hipotecaria, garantías 
preferidas, garantías preferidas autoliquidables, garantías preferidas de muy rápida 
realización, and otras garantías. That is, we treat loans with the following collateral 
as asset-based loans: real estate, other collateral with stand-alone title, deposits and 
other liquid financial securities, and other collateral. The values of Cuenta that are 
assigned to cash flow-based lending include: líneas de crédito (revolving lines) and 
13 Peruvian data has a structural break in 2010:Q2, at which point the Credit Registry 
applied a new size filter for corporate loans. This should not affect the estimates of the 
supply shocks; however, this compositional shift in the data will be apparent in the 
descriptive statistics.  
14 Several countries have community banks and savings banks. Their origin and stated 
main objective is different than that of commercial banks; however, they often act as 
traditional lenders.  
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préstamos (loans). Créditos-comercio exterior (loans for international trade) are 
assigned to the trade finance category. Finally, leasing is identified as arrendamiento 
financiero. The types of credit that do not fall into one of these categories represent, 
on aggregate, about 10% of all loans and 20% of total commercial loan volume. For 
Peru, we only capture international trade, whereas for Spain we capture all types of 
credit to firms. As such, the behavior of trade financing is not directly comparable 
across the two countries.  
3. Use of Different Types of Secured Bank Credit
In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics by loan type for 2004, 2008, and 2012.
Panel A corresponds to the Spanish sample, and Panel B presents the same statistics 
for Peru. In line with evidence from the U.S. syndicated loan market presented by 
Lian and Ma (2018), cash flow loans are an essential form of bank credit 
representing about half of all commercial credit in Spain and about a third of all 
commercial credit in Peru by loan volume or loan number. However, the universe of 
bank credit shows that asset-based credit is also pivotal, and perhaps not surprisingly 
even more so for an emerging economy. According to Djankov et al. (2008), debt 
enforcement tends to be weaker in emerging markets, making it more difficult to 
recover value in case of a default, rendering collateralized debt more attractive. 
Asset-based loans correspond to about 40% of lending volume in Spain, but only 
about a quarter of all outstanding loans; whereas in Peru, asset-based loans in the 
past ten years had represented about 50% of the lending volume and close to 40% of 
all loans. 
TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY LOAN TYPE 
The numbers correspond to the full sample of loans, including borrowers with one 
lender. Both panels exclude loans that do not fall into one of the four loan type 
categories. 
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Panel A.1: Prevalence of different loan types – Spain 
Loan Type % of loan volume (value-weighted) 
% of loan number 
(equally-weighted) 
 
2004 2008 2012 2004 2008 2012 
Asset-based 39.1% 43.7% 41.8% 14.7% 17.9% 26.5% 
Cash flow 48.2% 47.4% 51.7% 48.8% 50.4% 53.4% 
Trade financing 9.0% 5.7% 4.0% 22.5% 18.8% 12.4% 
Leasing 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 14.0% 12.9% 7.7% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Panel A.2: Loan size (outstanding balance) – Spain 
Loan size (’000 Euro) 
Mean S.D. Median 1st % 99th % 
Asset-based 1,001.93 5,977.96 171.00 9.00 15,000.00 
Cash flow 389.56 10,360.94 36.00 6.00 4,800.00 
Trade financing 141.64 585.57 52.00 6.00 1,486.00 
Leasing 100.82 716.62 24.00 6.00 1,199.00 
Panel B.1: Prevalence of different loan types – Peru 
Loan Type 
% of loan volume 
(value-weighted) 
% of loan number 
(equally-weighted) 
 
2004 2008 2012 2004 2008 2012 
Asset-based 43.5% 52.8% 51.7% 35.0% 42.7% 32.6% 
Cash flow 35.8% 24.5% 27.3% 41.2% 34.1% 35.0% 
Trade financing 14.3% 11.6% 8.1% 11.9% 8.1% 10.8% 
Leasing 6.4% 11.1% 12.8% 11.8% 15.2% 21.6% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Panel B.2: Loan size (outstanding balance) – Peru 
Loan size (’000 Peruvian Soles) 
sample average: $1 USD = S./ 3.13 
Mean S.D. Median 1st % 99th % 
Asset-based  6,436.4  60,712.7 437.5 0.02 88,014.8 
Cash flow  3,744.9  26,742.2 202.1 1.0 63,446.9 
Trade financing  4,382.6  14,114.0 1,113.5 22.3 49,557.8 
Leasing  2,410.0  17,483.8 235.2 1.4 34,139.8 
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Turning to the evolution over time, Figure 1 illustrates that there is heterogeneity 
in the patterns across loan types suggesting that the Spanish credit boom was mostly 
driven by asset-based lending. The average size of asset-based loans doubled during 
the boom, but it was then adjusted. Also, the increase in total credit was fourfold 
during the boom for asset-based loans while it was three- and two-fold for leasing 
and cash-flow lending, respectively. Similarly, the rise in asset-based lending seems 
to be at the heart for the credit expansion experienced in Peru.15 Consistent with the 
weaker creditor protection that we expect for an emerging market, leasing (often a 
direct alternative to asset-based loans) plays a substantial role as well.   
FIGURE 1. CREDIT EVOLUTION BY LOAN TYPE 
Panel A. Spain
15 As mentioned earlier, in 2010 Peru has reclassified corporate loans. Figure 1 only includes 
borrowers that appear in the credit registry after the reclassification. This softens the structural 
break in the data, but it can still be seen. The focus on the growth of leasing and asset-based loans 
however is unaffected by the methodology for constructing this graph, and is clearly there even in 
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Panel B. Peru 
In order to account for loan-specific heterogeneity when revisiting the bank 
lending channel literature, we need to condition the sample not only on borrowers 
with multiple lending relationships in a given quarter, but also require that there are 
multiple relationships within the same loan type. Note that this does not necessarily 
mean that the number of observations would drop relative to the sample in a KM-
style estimation. For example, if a borrower has two lenders and each lender has an 
asset-based loan and a trade-financing loan outstanding, our sample would have two 
borrower-quarter clusters (with two observations each), whereas KM-style estimation 
would have one (with two observations). However, if each lender has only one loan 
type, and the loan types are non-overlapping, our sample would have zero qualifying 
observations (KM-style estimation would still have one observation). Also, while the 
number of overall observations could increase, the number of unique borrowers, or 
number of observations per loan type cannot exceed the one in KM-style estimation. 
Table 2 gives insight into the overall impact on the sample. In the Spanish data, 
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Peruvian data, the drop is 8%. In both datasets the average loan size goes down 
because previously it was aggregated at the lender-quarter level across different loan 
types. We also see that the typical number of lenders per borrower after conditioning 
on loan type is about 3. 
TABLE 2—SAMPLE SIZE ACCOUNTING FOR LOAN TYPE 
Empirical models that use within borrower-quarter variation in lenders behavior rely 
on the sample of borrowers with multiple lending relationships outstanding at a given 
point in time. The purpose of this table is to illustrate the effect on the sample of 
accounting for the loan type. For Spain, loan amounts are expressed in thousands of 
euros. For Peru, loan amounts are expressed in thousands of Peruvian Soles. On 
average for the sample, $1 USD = S/. 3.13. 
 Panel A: Spain 








Mean Median 99th % 
Borrowers with multiple 
lenders per quarter 637,977 4.1 3 16 30,981,561 650.53 
Accounting for loan type 554,785 3.8 3 14 33,350,337 528.76 
 Asset-based 132,860 3.0 2 12 4,158,440 1,655.90 
 Cash flow 428,560 3.8 3 16 17,238,781 511.40 
 Trade financing 236,317 4.2 3 14 9,848,025 166.12 








Mean Median 99th % 
Borrowers with multiple 
lenders per quarter 15,102 4.0 3 10 498,329 9,5157 
Accounting for loan type 13,862 3.4 3 8 944,148 5,274.2 
 Asset-based 9,576 3.5 3 8 359,160  7,298.8 
 Cash flow 9,616 3.2 3 8 341,705  4,341.1 
 Trade financing 1,726 3.8 3 8 95,118  4,634.0 
 Leasing 3,843 3.2 3 7 148,165  2,929.2 
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FIGURE 2—USE OF DIFFERENT LOAN TYPES 
This figure illustrates the fraction of firms that use different loan types. We exclude 
loans not classified as asset-based loans, cash flow loans, trade financing, or leasing. 
The maximum number of loan types a borrower can use is 4. The sample otherwise 
corresponds to the full credit registry, unconditional on the number of lenders per 
borrowers. For each year, we use the last quarter.  
Panel A. Spain 
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To emphasize the importance of accounting for loan type for the 
generalizability of results out of sample, in Figure 2, we show the fraction of 
firms that use different loan types. This figure is constructed using the four loan 
types for the last quarter of 2004, 2008, and 2012. The sample corresponds to the 
full credit registry, unconditional on the number of lenders per borrower. For 
Spain, we find that the majority of borrowers rely on one loan type: in 2004, this 
number was 60%, and it increases slightly in later years. For Peru, we can see that 
at least prior to the financial crisis (that is, before the “Peruvian miracle” period) a 
large fraction of the borrowers relied on a limited number of loan types: in 2004, 
83% of borrowers relied on two or one loan type, and, in 2008, this number was 
73%.16 17
Table 3 instead provides insight into the persistence of usage of a particular 
loan type. For each country, we present three matrices that correspond to different 
periods. The analysis follows borrowers that at the end of a given year have only 
one loan type; each row corresponds to the starting loan type. (We count all 
borrowers with one loan type at the year end, even if in the past they had loans of 
other types.)  The first matrix looks at the probability that 1 year later (at the end 
of the next year) the borrower has a given loan type (indicated in columns). The 
sample is conditional on the borrower remaining in the credit registry sample at 
the end of the period. That is, borrowers that leave the sample are not counted. To 
summarize the results, we first take an average across borrowers within a year, 
and then report the average across years. The borrower can migrate to more than 
one type of credit. As a result, each row can add up to more than 100%. That said, 
if loan types are irrelevant, and the assignment is random, the benchmark would 
be 25%.  
Taking Peru as an example, we see that 94.9% of borrowers that have asset-
based loans will have an asset-based loan next year, and only 0.6% of them will 
completely substitute to a different loan type. However, we can see that about 
16 These differences in the use of one or more loan types do not appear related to borrowing 
from one or more banks. Figure A1 shows that the distribution of loan type is broadly similar 
for borrowers with multiple lenders and borrowers with single lenders.  
17 “Over the past decade, Peru has been one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies, 
with an average growth rate 5.9 percent in a context of low inflation (averaging 2.9 percent).” 
Source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru “Peru At-A-Glance” accessed May 31, 
2019. As mentioned earlier, 2010 in the Peruvian data is also characterized by a reporting 
switch.   
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17% of borrowers that exclusively rely on asset-backed loan expand into cash-
flow based loans. The typical maturity of a loan in Peru is about one year, so this 
result is unlikely to be mechanical. However, we also report results for a 3-year 
window (bottom panel). Overall, even at the longer horizon, the loan type appears 
to be very persistent for each of the loan types. There is also little mobility of the 
loan type during the financial crisis (middle panel). Similarly, we see very little 
loan migration in the Spanish sample, indicating that loan type choices are 
persistent.  
TABLE 3—PERSISTENCE OF LOAN TYPE FOR BORROWERS 
This table follows the migration of loan type for the same borrower (i) one year 
later, and (ii) three years later. We also separately report the result for the 
financial crisis period 2007-2009. The sample is conditional on borrowers that 
start with one loan type and remain in the Credit Registry. We consider loan 
migrations to be cases where the borrower took out new loans of a different loan 
type rather than its loan types in the previous year. The columns correspond to the 
loan type in the subsequent years. The numbers correspond to the average across 
years, that is, years are equally-weighted in the calculation. The borrower can 
migrate to more than one type of credit. As a result, each row can add up to more 
than 100%. Each individual number is capped at 100%. In Panel B, all reported 
numbers are different from zero at 1% confidence level.  
Panel A: Spain 
Loan type in the following period: 
Initial loan type: 
Asset-based Cash flow Trade 
financing 
Leasing 
Full sample, 1-year later 
 Asset-based 95.1% 8.5% 2.8% 3.1% 
 Cash flow 5.3% 95.6% 4.1% 3.9% 
 Trade financing 5.9% 9.8% 85.2% 5.7% 
 Leasing 6.5% 8.1% 5.4% 82.2% 
2007-2009, 1-year later 
 Asset-based 95.8% 4.9% 2.1% 1.7% 
 Cash flow 4.9% 94.9% 2.8% 2.2% 
 Trade financing 6.5% 4.6% 82.0% 2.8% 
 Leasing 6.7% 4.9% 4.2% 78.1% 
Full sample, 3-years later 
 Asset-based 90.8% 14.4% 3.4% 5.7% 
 Cash flow 11.2% 91.1% 5.4% 7.1% 
 Trade financing 12.8% 16.3% 74.1% 10.1% 
 Leasing 14.1% 13.7% 6.8% 55.1% 
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Panel B: Peru 
Loan type in the following period: 
Initial loan type: 
Asset-based Cash flow Trade 
financing 
Leasing 
Full sample, 1-year later 
 Asset-based 94.9% 17.3% 2.0% 4.6% 
 Cash flow 22.5% 97.5% 3.1% 6.0% 
 Trade financing 36.8% 39.9% 90.3% 14.8% 
 Leasing 50.5% 31.9% 5.7% 93.9% 
2007-2009, 1-year later 
 Asset-based 84.8% 28.0% 1.4% 6.6% 
 Cash flow 35.1% 96.5% 2.8% 9.6% 
 Trade financing 35.5% 36.4% 87.0% 19.6% 
 Leasing 44.2% 42.8% 4.2% 95.3% 
Full sample, 3-years later 
 Asset-based 86.3% 36.3% 4.6% 14.0% 
 Cash flow 44.7% 91.8% 6.3% 16.7% 
 Trade financing 57.3% 71.5% 63.5% 39.9% 
 Leasing 76.0% 59.5% 9.3% 79.6% 
4. Credit Supply Shocks and Loan Heterogeneity
In what follows, we incorporate loan types into the existing studies of the
shocks to credit supply that use micro-data. Specifically, we will replicate core 
results in three prominent papers that isolate the effects of credit supply: Amiti 
and Weinstein (2018), Jiménez et al. (2012), and Paravisini et al. (2015). 
Conveniently, Jiménez et al. (2012) look at the Spanish markets, and Paravisini et 
al. (2015) look at the Peruvian market, which is the data that we have, and it will 
help us confirm that our results are not driven by sample differences. However, a 
more profound reason for selecting these three studies is that they use related but 
different methodologies: they deviate in the strength of the assumptions required 
for identification of credit supply and, consequently, the generality of their 
insight. Amiti and Weinstein (2018) present an empirical methodology for 
constructing time-series of aggregate supply and demand shocks.  As the authors 
themselves emphasize, their shortcoming is that shocks to supply are identified 
from the data using a stringent structure for the behavior of supply and demand. 
(We present a detailed discussion of the identifying assumptions in the 
Appendix.) On the other side of the spectrum are studies that use a direct 
exogenous shock that impacts the balance sheet of the banks: an anticipated 
nuclear test in Pakistan that led to the collapse of the dollar deposit funding 
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(Khwaja and Mian, 2008), or shortages in foreign funding to Peruvian banks 
following the Lehman collapse (Paravisini et al., 2015). These studies rely on 
differential exposure of banks to such shocks; they “cleanly” identify marginal 
effects in the cross-section, but do not provide a path for measuring an aggregate 
impact.  
We want to stress that it is not our intention to opine on the usefulness or 
validity of these different methodological approaches. We take these studies as a 
state of empirical literature on the credit channel. Our core insight is that—
regardless of the approach—the credit channel operates differentially for separate 
loan types.  
4.1 Credit Supply Shocks in the Time-Series 
Amiti and Weinstein (2018), henceforth AW, develop an empirical 
methodology for constructing aggregate supply and demand shocks using 
matched bank-firm loan data (the AW application is based on a sample of around 
150 banks and 1,600 listed firms in Japan from 1990 to 2010). As the authors 
point out, many studies have shown that bank shocks matter for loan supply; 
however, that tells us little about how important bank loan supply in determining 
aggregate variables such as investments and employment is. The AW 
methodology builds on the following specification:  
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (1)
where ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers  to loa n g rowth  by fir m f from  b ank b in t im e t meas ur ed as 
log changes, 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  ref ers to the  “bank len ding cha nnel,” and 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers  to the  “firm 
borrowing channel.” One approach to identify both channels is to empirically 
estimate (1) in a regression framework that is saturated with firm-time and bank-
time fixed effects. AW show that this procedure is inefficient because it ignores 
general equilibrium considerations. For instance, a firm cannot borrow more 
without at least one bank willing to lend more (and vice versa). The core of AW’s 
methodological insight is that one can account for general equilibrium conditions 
at the aggregate level by imposing that total credit growth is recovered by 
summing up the sequences of the estimated fixed effects so that the R-squared of 
the regression is equal to one by construction. 
Using annual data from the Spanish and Peruvian credit registry, we estimate 
equation (1) with the AW methodology and recover a sequence of bank-year and 
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firm-year fixed effects that can be interpret as bank credit supply shocks and firm 
demand shocks. These shocks are labelled as “All loans (ALL)” because they are 
based on total credit encompassing all loan types at the bank-firm-year level as in 
the original AW approach. We next construct four alternative samples in which 
each bank-firm-year observation refers to credit exposure from a particular loan 
category. The AW methodology is then applied to each subsample and four 
different supply shocks are estimated for each bank in the sample:  asset-based 
loans (ABL), cash flow loans (CF), trade finance loans (TF), and leasing loans 
(LEA) shocks. 
FIGURE 3: AMITI AND WEINSTEIN (2018) BANK SHOCKS BY LOAN TYPE 
This figure plots Amiti and Weinstein (2018) bank shocks computed for the full 
sample against bank shocks computed by loan type. Panel A shows the results 
using data from Spain and Panel B using data from Peru. 
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Panel B. Peru 
Figure 3 compares the original AW shocks estimated from total credit at the 
bank-firm level with the bank shocks resulting from each loan category. Panel A 
corresponds to Spain, while Panel B corresponds to Peru. The takeaway is that the 
correlation is positive but relatively small. For Spain, the R-squared ranges from 
0.001 in the case of leasing to 0.282 for asset-based loans. For Peru, the range is 
from 0.001 to 0.266; the lowest and highest numbers correspond to leasing and 
cash-flow lending. It is striking that—with the exception of “trade finance” 
category, which captures different things for the two countries—the range of the 
magnitudes of errors resulting from omission of accounting for loan type are very 
similar for the two countries. Wide variation in errors across loan types suggests 
that banks’ credit supply is different depending on loan type contrary to the 
implicit assumption in the AW approach. Indeed, there are banks with an 
estimated positive shock from total credit (AW original setting) and a negative 
shock identified from, for instance, cash flow loans, which definitely indicates 
that loan heterogeneity matters for the identification of bank supply shocks. Note 
that we focus here on bank shocks, but the patterns are similar in the case of the 
estimated firm shocks shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix. 
Table 4 presents correlations of AW credit supply shocks across different loan 














-4 -2 0 2 4
Assets-backed (ABL)
n = 96    RMSE =         0.99














-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Cash-flow (CF)
n = 96    RMSE =         0.86














-4 -2 0 2 4
Trade financing (TF)
n = 96    RMSE =         0.88














-4 -2 0 2
Leasing (LEA)
n = 96    RMSE =         1.01
ALL = 0 + 0.00 LEA    R2 = 0.0%
ECB Working Paper Series No 2409 / May 2020 26
4 are even more revealing of the importance of loan heterogeneity for identifying 
bank credit supply shocks. In particular, Table 4 shows that in all the six cases the 
estimated correlations are basically zero for both countries, which clearly points 
to loan-specific credit supply shocks at the bank level. 
TABLE 4—VIS-À-VIS COMPARISON OF LOAN-SPECIFIC BANK SHOCKS 
This table presents regression coefficients of regressing Amiti and Weinstein 
(2018) bank shocks estimated by loan type on each other. The R-squared is 
reported in parentheses. For example, regressing bank shocks estimated using 
Spanish data for asset-based loans on bank shocks estimated for cash flow loans 
produces a slope of -0.05 and an R-squared of 0.003. 
Panel A: Spain 
Asset-based Cash flow Trade 
Cash flow -0.05 (0.3%) -- -- 
Trade -0.05 (0.2%) 0.04 (0.2%) --
Leasing -0.01 (0.0%) 0.02 (0.0%) -0.04 (0.2%)
Panel B: Peru 
Asset-based Cash flow Trade 
Cash flow  0.12 (1.7%) -- -- 
Trade  0.07 (0.4%) 0.17 (2.4%) -- 
Leasing -0.10 (1.5%) 0.13 (2.0%) -0.00 (0.0%)
Finally, in unreported results, we also estimated equation (1) considering two 
alternative sets of fixed effects. In the Spanish data, if we regress credit growth on 
firm-quarter fixed effects, we explain 28 percent of the total variation in credit 
growth (R-squared = 0.28). However, if we instead include (firm × loan type × 
quarter) fixed effects, the variation explained increases to 39 percent (R-squared = 
0.39). The corresponding numbers for Peru are 0.23 and 0.42. This shows that 
loan type heterogeneity matters to explain differences in credit growth across 
banks within each firm.   
Overall, in line with the evidence in Figure 1, the AW methodology reveals 
stark differences in behavior of bank credit shocks for different loan types over 
our sample period.  
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4.2 Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy 
In this section, we re-estimate the baseline specifications in Jiménez et al. 
(2012), which uses Spanish data. This study gets closer to the Khwaja and Mian 
(2008) setting, in that it relies on within-borrower differential response of lenders 
to monetary policy. One potential critique of this study, however, is that it does 
not have a clean exogenous credit supply shock, but instead looks at the ECB’s 
changes in interest rates for the euro area.  
As before, our idea is to incorporate loan-type into the analysis and to see if 
credit supply substantially differs across core loan types. Our identification is thus 
based on differences across banks within the same firm and loan type pair. 
Intuitively, we compare the same firm which has cash flow loans from two (or 
more) banks that are differentially exposed to changes in monetary policy. 
The complete replication exercise follows the following econometric model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 × 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓−1 + 
+𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼  ∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 × 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓−1+𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓−1 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  
(2)
where f, b, and t refer to firm, bank, and quarter, respectively. l refers to the loan 
type, and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  corresponds to (firm × loan type × quarter) fixed effects. Even 
though a large fraction of the borrowers relies on one loan type, many borrowers 
use more than one lender by loan type, which is what ultimately allows us to do 
the replication exercise. We consider two alternative dependent variables, namely, 
credit growth for the intensive margin and issuance of new loans for the extensive 
margin. Credit growth is based on annual log differences winsorized at -100% and 
+200%, and the new loan dummy takes value 1 when a bank-firm-loan type
triplet first appears in the sample and zero otherwise. ∆IRt is the annual change in
a 3-month Spanish interbank interest rate. ∆GDPt is annual growth of real GDP.
CAPbt−1 and LIQbt−1 refer to the capital and liquidity ratios at the bank level.
With a minor exception, controls are as in Jiménez et al. (2012). Banks 
characteristics include log total assets, doubtful assets ratio, return on assets, 
capital ratio, and liquidity ratio. Firm controls include: (i) ratio of equity over total 
assets, (ii) ratio of  the current assets over total assets, (iii) the log of the total 
assets of the firm (in 2008 euros), (iv) the log of one plus the firm’s age in years, 
(v) return on assets, (vi) a dummy variable that equals one if the firm had doubtful
loans the month before the loan was requested and zero otherwise, (vii) a dummy
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variable that equals one if the firm had doubtful loans any time previous to the 
month before the loan was requested and zero otherwise, (viii) the log of one plus 
the duration of the relationship between firms and bank (in months), and (ix) the 
log of the number of bank relationships. Regressions also include doubtful loan 
ratio of the industry in which the firm operates, and the log of the number of 
banks in the province where the firm is located. In terms of explanatory variables, 
the only differences between our analysis and Jiménez et al. (2012) are twofold. 
First, GDP data is not the same due to data revisions by the National Statistics 
Institute (e.g. new base year in 2010). Second, some controls (e.g. Herfindahl 
index in the sector and number of banks in the province) are not included because 
they are not readily available. 
Estimates are reported in Table 5. In order to analyze the role of loan 
heterogeneity, we cannot use loan application data because we do not observe the 
loan type of the rejected applications (i.e., the zeros). Instead, in columns (1) 
through (4), we start by replicating the results in Jiménez et al. (2012) using credit 
registry data. Regressions in columns (5) through (8) control for (firm × loan type 
× quarter) fixed effects and are the results of interest.  
Overall, the explanatory power increases, but the magnitude of the effects 
seems relatively unaltered when including loan type fixed effects. Note however 
that the estimates in Table 5 can be interpreted as a weighted average of the 
different effects by loan type with weights given by the number of observations. 
In Table 6, we report the estimates by loan type. All specifications include firm-
quarter fixed effects. The strongest specifications, the ones that can be interpreted 
as identification of credit supply, are the ones corresponding to interactions with 
bank capitalization and liquidity (Table 6, Panel B).   
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that cash flow loans are at the root of the 
overall results in Jiménez et al. (2012). Indeed, cash flow loans represent around 
53% of the total number of loans (about 11 million out of 21 million 
observations). Interestingly, asset-based loans, which were central to the Spanish 
credit boom, present a different pattern in the estimates.  
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4.3 The Global Financial Crisis and the Bank Lending Channel 
As mentioned earlier, the “gold standard” of measurement of credit supply in 
the cross-section requires a credible exogenous shock to banks balance sheet to 
instrument for the supply of credit. In that sense, some might argue that earlier 
results that built on Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and Jiménez et al. (2012) reflect 
a violation of identification assumptions in those studies. So, for completeness, 
we look at Paravisini et al. (2015) which uses Peruvian data. As in their study, we 
combine three data sets: bank-level data on Peruvian banks; loan-level data on 
credit in the domestic banking sector; and customs data for Peruvian firms 
containing record of exports at the 4-digit product level. There is only one 
difference between our data and the data used in Paravisini et al. (2015): our 
sample excludes the smallest companies. The average loan size to an exporting 
firm in our sample is $2.37 million, as opposed to $1.01 in their sample. Our data 
was obtained several years apart, and, in the most recent years, the Peruvian 
financial regulator prohibited access to the information on the smallest firms for 
purposes of external research. That said, on many dimensions our sample seems 
to match reasonably close. For example, their sample includes 41 lenders whereas 
ours has 40 lenders. So, put simply, any differences in estimates in our paper 
should be attributed to any differences between small and large companies.  
We use the same filters in our analysis: (i) the sample is constrained to July 
2007-June 2009, with July 2007-June 2008 corresponding to the period prior to 
the foreign capital flow reversal caused by the 2008 crisis (the credit supply 
instrument in their study); (ii) we only include banks and cajas (i.e., savings 
banks); (iii) we only look at firms with non-zero credit in the pre-crisis period; 
(iv) by construction, we only look at the universe of exporters; and (v) we look at
the volume of exports measured in kilograms.
We focus on two key results in Paravisini et al. (2015). The central insight of 
their paper can be already seen in the cross-sectional analysis that they report in 
their Table 3. The explanatory variables are the share of lenders’ assets funded 
with foreign debt, and an indicator variable of whether that share exceeds 10% 
(which is the sample mean for commercial banks for that time period.) The results 
are reported in Table 7. The estimates in column (1) closely match the results in 
Paravisini et al. (2015). Overall, this result shows that a banks’ foreign funding 
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was negatively correlated with its change in supply of credit following the 
financial crisis. This insight is the core building block of their study. 
TABLE 7—TRANSMISSION OF CREDIT SHOCKS BY BANKS AND BY LOAN TYPE 
Column (1) replicates the result in Table 3 in Paravisini et al. (2015). Columns 
(2)-(5) re-estimate this equation for different loan types. FDb is the share of 
foreign funding of bank b. D(FDb >10%) is a dummy that signals whether foreign 
funding of bank b is above 10%, the mean among the commercial banks (as in 
Paravisini et al. 2015). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are 
reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: Credit growth 
All Asset-based Cash flow Trade Leasing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(FDb > 10%) -0.207 -0.156 -0.292 -0.337 -1.122
(0.092) (0.130) (0.167) (0.178) (0.083)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,643 3,366 2,257 1,618 1,137 
R-squared 0.348 0.325 0.436 0.447 0.416 
As before, our goal is to illustrate that this aggregate result is limited to some, 
though not all loan types. The rest of Table 7 reports the same regression, but 
estimated within a sample of individual loan types. Once again, what seems to 
emerge is that cash-flow appears to be behind the core underlying mechanism. 
Asset-backed loans display a sharp difference compared to other types of credit; 
the statistical significance of the aggregate result comes from the loan types other 
than asset-based loans. Overall, the structure of this empirical model substantially 
reduces the number of observations for individual loan types, which likely also 
impacts the statistical significance of the results.18 
Table 8 instead uses a firm-product-destination level panel of export volumes 
to estimate intensive margin elasticity of exports to credit shocks. Credit supply is 
instrumented using banks reliance of foreign funding. Paravisini et al. (2015) 
emphasize that their empirical strategy relies on accounting for shocks to export 
demand and input cost which they achieve by looking at variation within product-
destination. As with Table 7, our estimates are higher than in the original paper, 
but reasonably close. Separation of the result by loan-type indicates that the 
18 Inclusion of (firm × loan type) fixed effects preserves the signs, but reduces the economic 
and statistical significance of the results.  
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aggregate result does not generalize to leasing or international trade, although in 
this result, contraction in asset-backed loans does lead to substantial contraction 
in exports. As before, cash-flow loans continue to play a significant role in 
economic terms.   
TABLE 8— ELASTICITY OF INTENSIVE MARGIN OF EXPORTS TO CREDIT SHOCKS BY 
LOAN TYPE 
Columns (1) and (2) replicate the results in Table 5 in Paravisini et al. (2015). 
Columns (3)-(6) re-estimate this equation for different loan types. Columns (2)-
(6) are estimated using instrumental variables. In the IV regressions, the change in
(log of) credit of firm i, ∆lnCi, is instrumented with the measure of lender’s
exposure to foreign funding which is a weighted average of D(FDb >10%), a
dummy that signals whether foreign funding of bank b is above 10%, the mean
among the commercial banks (as in Paravisini et al. 2015). Standard errors are
clustered at the product-destination level and are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable: ∆ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
OLS IV 
All All Asset-based Cash flow Trade Leasing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 0.026 0.455 0.431 0.294 0.009 -1.508
 
(0.020) (0.239) (0.167) (0.982) (0.332) (1.263) 
Product-destination FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,715 3,715 3,254 2,751 2,456 2,340 
R-squared 0.283 0.284 0.283 0.299 0.301 0.295 
As a final insight, we look at another study that is also focused on the 
financial crisis as a source of a shock to banks liquidity, but uses Spanish data, 
that is Bentolila et al. (2018). This paper exploits differences across banks that 
were bailed out by the Spanish government (“weak banks”) versus the rest 
(“healthy banks”). Following Khwaja and Mian (2008), Bentolila et al. (2018) 
consider a first-stage regression at the bank-firm level showing that weak banks 
curtailed lending relative to the other banks during the global financial crisis. We 
re-estimate the first-stage regression in Bentolila et al. (2018) at the bank-firm-
loan type level. More formally: 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋  𝑏𝑏𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓  +  𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 +  𝐵𝐵𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓′ 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  +  𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 
(3) 
where, as before, f, b, and l refer to firm, bank, and type of loan, respectively. The 
dependent variable is credit growth between 2006:Q4 and 2010:Q4. The unit of 
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observation is bank-firm-loan type level. Weak  bank , a dummy identifying 
bailed out banks, is the explanatory variable of interest. Z is the log of (one plus) 
the length of the bank-firm relationship, measured in months. Bank is a vector of 
bank controls, namely, log total assets, doubtful assets ratio, return on assets, 
capital ratio, and liquidity ratio. In the first specification of equation (3) we 
include firm fixed effects, as in Bentolila et al. (2018). All other specifications 
include firm-loan type fixed effects.  
TABLE 9—WEAK BANK ATTACHMENT AND CREDIT GROWTH BY LOAN TYPE 
Column (1) replicates the results in Table 3 of Bentolila et al. (2018) using loan-
level data. Column (2) includes firm-loan fixed effects. Columns (3) to (6) re-
estimate this equation for different loan types. The dependent variable is credit 
growth between 2006:Q4-2010:Q4. The estimated coefficients are obtained from 
linear probability models estimated using least squares. Weak bank which is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the bank was bailed by the Spanish authorities and zero 
otherwise. All regressions include controls as in Bentolila et al. (2018). Standard 
errors clustered at the bank-quarter level are reported in parentheses. 
All All Asset-based Cash flow Trade Leasing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weak bank -7.61 -8.06 0.19 -11.35 -4.59 -16.40
(3.01) (2.90) (2.08) (2.78) (4.61) (4.63) 
Firm FE yes -- -- -- -- -- 
Firm-loan type FE -- yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.356 0.452 0.453 0.446 0.442 0.493 
Adj. R-squared 0.068 0.119 0.053 0.120 0.125 0.115 
Observations 325,118 325,118 49,806 187,037 76,319 11,956 
Banks 139 139 126 136 118 49 
Firms 100,521 100,521 21,013 69,177 27,667 5,095 
The results are reported in Table 9. Column (1) corroborates the finding in 
Bentolila et al. (2018) that, for a given firm, weak banks reduced credit supply 
vis-a-vis healthy banks. Column (2) shows that this result is similar when 
including firm-loan type fixed effects. However, results by individual loan type 
indicate that cash-flow based loans are at the root of this finding. Estimated 
effects are not significant for asset-based loans and trade finance. Also, the 
number of cash flow loans is larger than that of the other loan types together. 
5. Conclusions
Practitioners commonly refer to four distinct loan types: asset-based loans,
cash flow loans, trade financing, and leasing. At the heart of this distinction is the 
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speed and size of recovery in default. Some of these types of credit had been 
directly or indirectly studied in the literature; however, this distinction has been 
overlooked by the literature focusing on the conditions of bank credit supply. Yet, 
as we show, such distinction is important as a large fraction of companies in any 
economy relies on a single loan type, and these loan types tend to be very 
persistent. Moreover, given that the quality of measurement of supply effects is 
central to several of the studies using narrow fixed effect identification, 
accounting for the loan type is an important identifying assumption.  
 This paper uses bank-firm matched credit-registry data from two largely 
unrelated countries—Spain and Peru—to show that four loan types are easily 
identifiable in the data. We show that these four loan types represent the bulk of 
commercial credit in both economies, and, importantly, that the bank lending 
channel varies by loan type.  
An important contribution of this paper is that we use the micro data to gain 
insight into what type of data drives the existing findings on credit supply by 
replicating several notable studies that tackle different questions and use different 
methodologies. Using the approach in Amiti and Weinstein (2018), we show that 
the time-series of aggregate credit supply shocks is driven by individual loan 
types. In the Spanish data, the aggregate credit supply shocks are most strongly 
correlated with supply shocks in asset-based loans, while the correlation is weaker 
for other types of credit including cash flow loans (one of the two most prominent 
types of credit). Instead, in Peru, aggregate bank shocks are mainly associated 
with cash flows loans and international trade credit behavior. Replication of 
studies looking into cross-sectional variation reveals that much of what we know 
from these studies is attributable to cash flow loans, and not to asset-based loans. 
Overall, our results imply that not accounting for loan heterogeneity can bias 
estimates of the bank lending channel and more generally suggest that it is 
important to account for heterogeneity in loan type in analyses of the economic 
significance of credit market disruptions. While our study makes a first step to 
quantifying the importance of loan heterogeneity, more research is needed to 
improve our understanding of the credit type choices that firms make, and how 
these choices influence the transmission of financial shocks. 
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APPENDIX 1. ESTIMATES OF CREDIT SHOCKS IN THE PRESENCE OF LOAN
HETEROGENEITY 
Consider the following regression model of loan growth typically used in 
studies that build on methodology in Khwaja and Mian (2008): 
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  (A1) 
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 refers to loan growth by firm f from bank b in time t,  𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  denotes a 
bank-specific shock (e.g., a liquidity shock due to nuclear tests in the case of 
Khwaja and Mian, 2008), and 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   refers to a firm-specific demand shock. The 
expectation of the error term is assumed to be zero: 𝐸𝐸 [𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓] = 0. This type of 
empirical specification has been used to disentangle the firm-borrowing channel 
(demand shock 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) from the bank lending channel (supply shock 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓). The 
inclusion of time-varying firm fixed effects implies that identification is based on 
variation in credit across banks with the same firm, keeping firm credit demand 
constant across banks. 
The crucial assumption is that firms’ credit demand is the same across all 
banks. This assumption may be violated if firms’ credit demand is bank specific. 
Such would be the case if different lenders are providing different types of credit. 
For example, a firm pursuing an acquisition of another company could get a cash-
flow based loan from bank “A”, and in parallel, it could get an asset-based loan to 
finance an equipment purchase from bank “B”. Now, imagine a given firm 
experiences a demand shock leading to an increase in its demand for credit of the 
second type. If this were the case, the demand shock would apply only to the 
asset-based loan (bank “B”) instead of overall credit (from both banks “A” and 
“B”). 
We can formalize the bias that arises when the true specification includes 
firm-loan specific shocks by decomposing the firm demand shock 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  into two-
components: 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  = 𝜂𝜂�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , namely, an overall firm demand shock (𝜂𝜂�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) and a 
firm-loan specific shock (𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓), where l denotes the loan type. The true model to 
be estimated would then be: 
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓   (A2)
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 refers to loan growth of loan type l by firm f from bank b in time t. 
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We can assess the magnitude of the bias by comparing different estimates of 
equation (A2). In particular, we can first estimate 𝛽𝛽�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 by including time-varying 
firm fixed effects 𝜂𝜂�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 in equation (A2) but without including time-varying firm-
loan fixed effects 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓: 
𝛽𝛽�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝛽𝛽 +
𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐(𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ,  𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)
𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶(𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)
(A3) 
We can then estimate 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 by including time-varying firm-loan type fixed 
effects (𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) in the regression. The inclusion of firm-loan type fixed effects 
implies that identification is based on variation across banks in credit with the 
same firm and the same type of loan. Since 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽, we can obtain the 
magnitude of the bias: 
𝛽𝛽�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =
𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐(𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ,  𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)
𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋𝐶𝐶(𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 )
(A4) 
The empirical model in (A1) can be generalized, following Amiti and 
Weinstein (2018), to:  
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (A5) 
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 refers to loan growth by firm f from bank b in time t, 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers to 
the bank-lending channel (bank-specific supply shock), and 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers to the firm 
borrowing channel (firm-specific demand shock).  
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APPENDIX 2. ASSUMPTIONS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF CREDIT SUPPLY 
In the existing literature, there exist three approaches to identifying credit 
supply using loan level data. These approaches vary in the strength of the 
assumptions required for identification of credit supply and in the generality of 
their application. In this Appendix, we set out the assumptions of each method, 
starting with the method that is the most general but also requires the strongest set 
of assumptions.  
The first approach is introduced by Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and it 
estimates the following model of credit growth: 
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (B1)
where ∆𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 refers to loan growth by firm f from bank b in time t, 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers to a 
bank-specific shock, and 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  refers to a firm-specific shock. The authors interpret 
𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  as a (bank-specific) supply shock and 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  as a (firm-specific) demand shock.  
The key assumptions underlying the identification in AW are: (i) credit 
demand is firm-specific, not bank-specific; and (ii) credit supply is bank-specific, 
not firm-specific. Any shock that leads banks to lend more to some firms than 
others will result in supply being misinterpreted as demand. Such firm-specific 
supply of credit by banks could originate from lender specialization, differences 
in market power, or the value of bank relationships. Similarly, any shift in firm’s 
credit demand from some banks relative to others may lead to credit demand 
being misinterpreted as supply. Such bank-specific demand by firms could 
originate from borrower specialization in certain type of credit products, 
differences in the type of collateral used for credit, or the existence of different 
loan types more generally. 
The approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) instead estimates the 
following model of credit growth: 
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 . (B2)
The difference is in 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  which denotes a bank-specific shock (typically a liquidity 
shock of some sort). Focusing on an exogenous bank shock imposes more 
structure on the model and potentially allows for stronger identification – to the 
extent that 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  relates to bank-specific shocks – at the loss of generality. The 
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key assumptions underlying KM are: (i) credit demand is firm-specific, not bank-
specific; (ii) the time variation in 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  is not correlated with shifts in credit 
demand; and (iii) the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is constant across banks and firms. 
The first assumption is identical in both approaches. Any shift in firm demand 
for loans from some banks relative to others (e.g. originating from differences in 
type of credit) may lead to demand being misinterpreted as supply, rendering this 
assumption invalid. The second and third assumptions are strictly weaker than the 
first assumption in AW. If there is lender specialization and firm demand is bank-
specific, then these two assumptions are not met. This would be the case, for 
instance, if in response to a demand shock, firms demand more credit from banks 
that specialize in the type of credit that the firms demand (e.g. export credit). 
Paravisini et al. (2017) extends the KM approach by estimating: 
∆ ln 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 . (B3)
The new element, 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, denotes a demand shock that varies by firm and bank. 
Paravisini et al. (2017) interpret 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 as a source of variation related to credit 
demand that varies with lender specialization. In their study, they look at banks 
specializing in specific export markets. This approach allows for stronger 
identification to the extent that 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 relates to bank-specific firm demand.  
The key additional assumption in Paravisini et al. (2017) is that the coefficient 
𝛾𝛾 is constant across banks and firms. This assumption is not met if the 
relationship between bank-specific firm demand and credit growth is not stable 
over time. For instance, this could be due to changes over time in the type of 
firms that banks specialize in or shifts in bank market power that cause 
disproportionate shifts in the demand for certain type of loans. In the application 
of Paravisini et al. (2017) this would be the case if the type of banks operating in 
the firm’s export markets suddenly changes (for instance, due to regulation or 
firm entry). In that case, the term 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 may capture bank-specific supply shocks 
that will be misinterpreted as demand. However, to the extent that lender 
specialization is stable over time, the assumption underlying the approach in 
Paravisini et al. (2017) is likely to be met. This approach, therefore, requires the 
weakest identifying assumption of the three methods considered. Its application 
is, however, also more limited given the additional structure imposed on the 
model and the need to find suitable proxies for 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓.  
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
FIGURE A1: DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN TYPES FOR FIRMS INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED
FROM KHWAJA AND MIAN (2008)-ST YLE ESTIMATION 
This figure plots the distribution of loan type for borrowers with multiple lenders 
in a given quarter (KM sample) and for single lender borrowers. The idea is to 
understand whether the estimates in the KM-style approach are based on a sample 
with a similar distribution of loan types as in the sample of single lender 
borrowers. We first compute the distribution for each year in the sample and then 
take the average across years.  
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FIGURE A2: AMITI AND WEINSTEIN (2018) BANK SHOCKS BY LOAN TYPE 
This figure plots Amiti and Weinstein (2018) firm shocks computed for the full 
sample against bank shocks computed by loan type. Panel A shows the results 
using data from Spain and Panel B using data from Peru. 
Panel A. Spain 












-5 0 5 10
Assets-based loans (ABL)
n = 5251    RMSE =         0.92












-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Cash-flow loans (CF)
n = 5251    RMSE =         0.95












-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Trade financing loans (TF)
n = 5251    RMSE =         0.91












-2 0 2 4 6 8
Leasing loans (LEA)
n = 5251    RMSE =         0.99















-2 0 2 4 6
Assets-backed (ABL)
n = 1178    RMSE =         0.96















-5 0 5 10
Cash-flow (CF)
n = 1178    RMSE =         0.95













0 5 10 15 20
Trade financing (TF)
n = 1178    RMSE =         0.88















-5 0 5 10 15
Leasing (LEA)
n = 1178    RMSE =         0.98
ALL = -0 + 0.18 LEA    R2 = 3.3%
ECB Working Paper Series No 2409 / May 2020 46
TABLE A1—ASSET TANGIBILITY AND LOAN TYPE 
This table provides support for our loan classification. For Spanish firms, we have 
financial information from a source that is independent of the credit registry, 
taken from Almunia et al. (2018), for the period 2002:Q1-2010:Q4. Our focus is 
on assets’ tangibility, measured as PPE/Total assets. Each observation in the 
sample is firm-quarter. The dependent variable is the share of credit of each loan 
type: asset-based loans, cash flow loans, trade financing, and leasing, 
respectively. Controls include: firm age, total assets, leverage ratio, a set of 
industry-year dummies, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and are reported in parentheses. 








Asset tangibility 0.75 -0.53 -0.31 0.09 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00) 
Observations 2,753,435 2,753,435 2,753,435 2,753,435 
R-squared 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.05 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Clustering yes yes yes yes 
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